Why I Am Not A Property Dualist

PDF EBook by John Rogers Searle

EBook Description

"Because the traditional vocabulary tells us that the mental and the physical are two distinct ontological categories and because consciousness is not ontologically reducible to its neuronal base, we suppose that is not a part of the physical world, in the way that these other phenomena are. Why I Am Not A Property Dualist PDF EBook That is the deeper mistake of property dualism. And that is precisely where I part company with the property dualist. The problem is not only that we have an obsolete seventeenth- PDFcentury vocabulary that contrasts the mental and the physical, but that we also have a misconception of the nature of reduction. Causal reduction does not necessarily imply ontological reduction, though typically where we have a causal reduction as in the case of the liquidity, solidity and colour we have tended to make an ontological reduction. But the impossibility of an ontological reduction in the case of consciousness does not give it any mysterious metaphysical status. Consciousness does not exist in a separate realm and it does not have any causal powers in addition to those of its neuronal base any more than solidity has any extra causal powers in addition to its molecular base."

-John R. Searle, p. 6 Like this book? Read online this: The Relaxation and Stress Reduction Workbook, Intellectual Property Law.

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